Reduced Autobiographical Memory Specificity Predicts Depression and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder After Recent Trauma by Kleim, Birgit & Ehlers, Anke
Reduced Autobiographical Memory Specificity Predicts Depression and
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder After Recent Trauma
Birgit Kleim and Anke Ehlers
King’s College London
In this prospective longitudinal study, the authors examined the relationship between reduced specificity in
autobiographical memory retrieval and the development of depression, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD),
and specific phobia after injury in an assault. Assault survivors (N  203) completed the Autobiographical
Memory Test (J. M. G. Williams & K. Broadbent, 1986) at 2 weeks after the trauma as well as structured
clinical interviews at 2 weeks and 6 months. Participants with acute stress disorder or major depression at 2
weeks, but not those with phobia, retrieved fewer specific autobiographical memories than those without the
respective disorder. Reduced memory specificity at 2 weeks also predicted subsequent PTSD and major
depression at 6 months over and above what could be predicted from initial diagnoses and symptom severity.
Moderator analyses showed that low memory specificity predicted later depression in participants with prior
episodes of major depression but not in those without prior depression. Mediation analyses suggested that
rumination partly mediated and perceived permanent change fully mediated the effects of low memory
specificity on posttrauma psychopathology at follow-up.
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Overgeneral Memory and Depression
People with major depression often show difficulty in retrieving
specific autobiographical memories (Williams & Broadbent, 1986;
for a review see Williams et al., 2007). When asked to remember
a specific event from their lives in response to a cue word (e.g.,
“happy”), individuals with depression show an overgeneral mem-
ory bias (OGM), that is, they tend to reply with descriptions that
summarize several different events (e.g., “I am always happy when
I visit friends”) rather than a specific instance (“I was happy when
my school friend rang me last week”). The origins and conse-
quences of OGM in depression have attracted much attention (see
Williams et al., 2007, for a review). Depression is often triggered
by stressful life events (e.g., Kendler, Karkowski, & Prescott,
1999). This raises the issue of whether stressful or traumatic life
events play a role in the development of OGM retrieval. Williams
(1996) suggested that an overgeneral retrieval style may develop
as a means of regulating affect (affect-regulation hypothesis) after
stressful events. He proposed that survivors of trauma or severe
stress may learn to avoid the painful emotions that would be
provoked if they recalled their negative experiences by halting
autobiographical memory retrieval prematurely, that is, before a
specific memory is retrieved. Over time, the truncated search may
become generalized, leading to an overgeneral level of autobio-
graphical remembering. Such an overgeneral retrieval style is
thought to be an index of vulnerability to subsequent depression.
OGM has indeed been shown to predict depression and anxiety
after a failed in vitro fertilization (van Minnen, Wessel, Verhaak,
& Smeenk, 2005) and to interact with the occurrence of stressful
life events in predicting subsequent depression in college students
(Gibbs & Rude, 2004).
Overgeneral Memory and Trauma
The affect-regulation hypothesis suggests that exposure to
stressful events is a precursor of OGM. Empirical research only
offers partial support for a relationship between OGM and trauma
(Moore & Zoellner, 2007) in that some, but not all, studies found
an association. Among depressed samples, a large proportion of
individuals with OGM also reported a history of trauma and
trauma-related intrusive and avoidance symptoms (e.g., Dalgleish
et al., 2003; Hermans et al., 2004; Kuyken & Brewin, 1995).
Henderson, Hargreaves, Gregory, and Williams (2002) found in a
nonclinical sample that women who reported a history of child-
hood abuse had difficulties retrieving specific memories in re-
sponse to cue words. However, some studies failed to find an
association between childhood trauma and OGM (e.g., Johnson,
Greenhoot, Glisky, & McCloskey, 2005; Wessel, Meeren, Peeters,
Arntz, & Merckelbach, 2001).
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http://www.apa.org/about/copyright.html.OGM and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)
The inconsistent findings on the relationship between trauma
and OGM raise the possibility that OGM may not be a necessary
consequence of trauma (Moore & Zoellner, 2007). However,
OGM may influence how well people adapt to such extremely
stressful experiences. Problems in autobiographical memory re-
trieval may prevent trauma survivors from coming to terms with
the trauma and from reclaiming their former lives. Researchers and
clinicians have observed that people with PTSD appear “frozen” at
the time of the traumatic event (e.g., Herman, 1992) and that they
have difficulty remembering what they used to be like before the
traumatic event (e.g., Ehlers, Maercker, & Boos, 2000). OGM may
contribute to such changes in self-perception.
Several studies have found that trauma survivors with PTSD or
acute stress disorder (ASD) show less specific autobiographical
memory retrieval than those without PTSD or ASD (Harvey,
Bryant, & Dang, 1998; Kangas, Henry, & Bryant, 2005; McNally,
Lasko, Macklin, & Pitman, 1995; Scho ¨nfeld & Ehlers, 2006;
Scho ¨nfeld, Ehlers, Bo ¨llinghaus, & Rief, 2007).
OGM and Other Anxiety Disorders
Interestingly, a series of studies have found that OGM does not
appear to be associated with most other anxiety disorders (Burke &
Mathews, 1992; Wenzel & Jordan, 2005; Wenzel, Werner, Coch-
ran, & Holt, 2004). Thus, the literature suggests that OGM may be
a specific feature of depression and ASD/PTSD. However, there is
a lack of studies directly comparing the relationships between
OGM and different psychological outcomes after stress.
OGM and the Maintenance of Depression and PTSD
It has been suggested that OGM plays a role in the maintenance
of depression (e.g., Gibbs & Rude, 2004; Peeters, Wessel,
Merckelbach, & Boon-Vermeeren, 2002; Williams et al., 2006).
OGM has been shown to predict poorer long-term clinical outcome
in people with depression (e.g., Brittlebank, Scott, Williams, &
Ferrier, 1993; Raes, Hermans, Williams, Beyers, et al., 2006;
Williams, 1996). It has also been shown to be associated with
deficits in social problem solving (Goddard, Dritschel, & Burton,
1996) and low ability to imagine future events (Williams et al.,
1996), both of which may contribute to the maintenance of nega-
tive affect and hopelessness.
It remains as yet unclear whether OGM is also involved in the
maintenance of PTSD. Theories of PTSD suggest that recovery
from trauma requires the integration of the traumatic experience
with the person’s schemas about the self and the world (e.g.,
Resick & Schnicke, 1993) and with other autobiographical mem-
ories that determine the person’s sense of self (e.g., Conway &
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Ehlers & Clark, 2000). An impaired ability
to retrieve specific memories from one’s past (in particular posi-
tive memories) may impede such integration and thus delay re-
covery (see also Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Harvey et al., 1998; van
Minnen et al., 2005; Williams et al., 2006). Prospective longitu-
dinal studies are sparse and have generated mixed evidence as to
whether OGM predicts greater long-term posttraumatic stress
symptom severity. Harvey et al. (1998) assessed OGM shortly
following accidents and found that low specificity in retrieving
memories from the period following the trauma to positive cues
predicted subsequent PTSD. However, Kangas et al. (2005) did not
find that OGM predicted subsequent PTSD in recently diagnosed
cancer patients, although OGM was related to concurrent ASD. In
the latter study, memory retrieval was not restricted to the time
following the trauma. In the present study, we investigated pro-
spectively whether OGM predicts PTSD and depression in a
sample of assault survivors.
Possible Mechanisms of Maintenance
What are the possible mechanisms by which OGM may put
people at risk of chronic depression and PTSD after trauma? One
possible way in which OGM may impede recovery is through a
reciprocal relationship with rumination (Williams, 1996). Accord-
ing to the capture and rumination hypothesis (Williams et al.,
2006), the cues used in the standard measure of OGM, the Auto-
biographical Memory Test (AMT; Williams & Broadbent, 1986),
may activate rumination and abstract negative self-schemas so that
respondents get “captured” in abstract cognitions and have prob-
lems progressing to the retrieval of specific memories. The failure
to retrieve specific memories may in turn make it more difficult to
correct the negative self-schemas and, thus, maintain negative
thinking and related negative affect. People with depression or
PTSD may be vulnerable to this maintaining process, as these
disorders are characterized by negative self-related schemas and
rumination (e.g., Foa, Ehlers, Clark, Tolin, & Orsillo, 1999; In-
gram, Miranda, & Segal, 1998; Murray, Ehlers, & Mayou, 2002;
Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). In contrast, people with other
anxiety disorders—such as specific phobias—may be less suscep-
tible, as their anxiety is mainly focused on external situations, and
their self-schema may be less affected. In PTSD, failure to retrieve
specific memories may be particularly relevant for appraisals of
permanent change, that is, the appraisal that one and one’s life
have irreversibly changed for the worse by the trauma. Scho ¨nfeld
and Ehlers (2006) found that OGM was associated with rumination
and with perceived permanent change in trauma survivors. Per-
ceived permanent change may interfere with people reclaiming
their former lives after trauma and delay recovery. It has been
shown to predict chronic PTSD (Dunmore, Clark, & Ehlers, 2001;
Ehlers et al., 2000).
The above considerations raise the possibility that rumination
and negative self-related schemas mediate the relationship be-
tween OGM and psychopathology. Preliminary data in support of
this hypothesis were presented by Raes, Hermans, Williams, Bey-
ers, et al. (2006), who showed that rumination partly mediated the
relationship between OGM and subsequent depression. Data on
PTSD and self-related schemas are lacking. In the present study,
therefore, we considered rumination and perceived permanent
change as potential mediators between OGM and depression and
PTSD after trauma.
Aims of the Study
The purpose of the present study was to examine autobiograph-
ical memory retrieval in a sample exposed to a recent severe
stressor, injury in a violent assault. We studied whether memory
specificity is related to major depression, ASD, and specific
assault-related phobia at 2 weeks postassault. To our knowledge,
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predicting these three disorders in the same sample of trauma
survivors. On the basis of previous findings (Gibbs & Rude, 2004;
Harvey et al., 1998; Wenzel, Jackson, & Holt, 2002), we hypoth-
esized that assault survivors with major depression and those with
ASD, but not those with specific phobia, would retrieve fewer
specific memories than those without these disorders. Further-
more, we expected that memory specificity at 2 weeks would
predict major depression and PTSD at 6 months following assault,
and we tested whether it predicted over and above initial symp-
toms. In this study, we also tested whether rumination and per-
ceived permanent change would mediate the influence of OGM on
depression and PTSD. Finally, we considered history of childhood
abuse, history of major depression, sex, and ethnicity as potential
moderators of the relationship between memory specificity and
posttrauma psychopathology (Williams et al., 2007).
Method
Participants
Participants were recruited from assault survivors who were
treated for their injuries at the emergency department of a large
urban teaching hospital during the period between July 2003 and
December 2004. To be eligible for the study, participants had to
understand and speak English fluently enough to be able to answer
interview questions and fill in questionnaires. Participants with
current psychosis and substance dependence, as well as those who
could not remember the event (e.g., because of a head injury), were
excluded.
A total of 1,063 assault survivors who attended the emergency
department during the recruitment period were contacted, of whom
389 did not fulfill inclusion criteria, and 197 declined to take part.
Another 255 were initially interested but failed to schedule or
attend the research session within the designated time period. A
total of 222 participants consented to participate in a research
session at 2 weeks after the assault, and 203 (91%) of these
completed the AMT. Reasons for noncompletion were too little
time to complete the test and inability to concentrate for an
extended period of time. Table 1 presents the demographic and
clinical characteristics of the study sample. Participants had mainly
been physically assaulted (n  200, 99%; n  3 sexual assaults).
At 6-month postassault, 190 of the participants who had completed
the AMT (83%) completed a further diagnostic interview.
To test whether the sample was representative of assault survi-
vors presenting to this emergency department, we compared their
demographic characteristics with those of a random sample drawn
from all 2,785 assault survivors treated in the department during a
period of 1 year. The study group and the random sample did not
differ in age, sex, or severity of the injuries (all ps  .296).
However, comparison with hospital data showed that the study
sample may
1 have comprised significantly more Caucasian partic-
ipants than the random sample, 
2(1, N  416)  17.12, p  .001,
namely 57.2% compared with a recorded 36.9% in the hospital
sample. This difference may be due to the fact that some non-
Caucasians had to be excluded because of language difficulties.
We therefore tested whether ethnicity moderated the effects of
memory specificity on psychopathology.
AMT
The AMT (Williams & Broadbent, 1986) was administered
individually by Birgit Kleim following the procedures outlined in
Williams’s (2003) manual. Participants saw 12 cue words (6
positive words: cheer, pleased, relieved, lively, glorious, peaceful;
6 negative words: worse, guilty, hopeless, awful, grave, ugly),
which occurred in random order on a computer screen. Positive
and negative words were matched for word frequency derived
from the London–Lund corpus of English conversations (see
Brown, 1984). The participants’ task was to retrieve, and briefly
describe, a specific personal memory in response to each cue word.
The experimenter explained that a specific memory is a past
experience that happened on a particular day. Participants were
told that the event could be important or trivial. The time period
from which events could be recalled was not specified. The ex-
perimenter gave examples of appropriate specific memories and
inappropriate general memories, and gave participants the oppor-
tunity to practice the task with practice words. The AMT was not
started until the participants had retrieved at least one specific
memory to one of the practice words. Participants were given a
maximum of 30 s to retrieve a memory for each word. If they did
not provide a response in that time, this was scored as an omission.
Responses were tape-recorded and later transcribed and scored for
the percentage of first memories that were specific memories and
for the assault-relatedness of specific memories. A memory was
rated as assault-related when it involved the assault or its conse-
quences (e.g., “when I looked into the mirror and saw the scar from
the assault this morning”). A trained psychology graduate student
who was blind to participants’ diagnostic status rated all memories.
A second independent rater who was blind to participants’ diag-
nostic status scored a random sample of 50 oral AMT responses;
good interrater agreement was obtained for the categorization of
specific versus nonspecific responses (.87) and for the cate-
gorization of assault-relatedness (.78).
Assessment of Diagnoses and Symptom Severities
At 2 weeks, diagnoses of current and past (i.e., prior to the
assault) major depression, ASD, and assault-related specific pho-
bia were established with standard structured clinical interviews—
the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM–IV (SCID; First,
Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 1996) and the Acute Stress Disorder
Scale (ASDS, Interview Version; Bryant & Harvey, 2000), respec-
tively. A trained psychologist (Birgit Kleim) conducted all inter-
views under the supervision of Anke Ehlers. Note that Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed.; DSM–IV;
American Psychiatric Association, 1994) proposes a hierarchical
relationship in the diagnosis of some of the psychiatric disorders,
stipulating that phobia may not be diagnosed if it is better ac-
counted for by PTSD. To allow the investigation of phobic re-
sponses independent of the presence of PTSD symptoms, we
omitted this rule in the present study, and participants could thus
1 This figure presents an underestimate of the number of Caucasian
hospital attendees. The figures are based on emergency department codes
that require the staff to code ethnicity in 80 categories on the basis of
country of origin. In practice, the category of “other” was often for
non-British participants, regardless of their ethnic background.
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phobic symptoms severe enough to cause clinically significant
distress.
The ASDS rates the presence of 19 ASD symptoms, each on a
scale ranging from 0 (not at all)t o4( very much). It determines a
diagnosis of ASD as well as a symptom severity score (the sum of
the scores for each symptom). In parallel, a depression symptom
severity score was calculated as the sum of DSM–IV depression
symptoms in the SCID (coded as 1  absent,2 subthreshold,
and 3  present). Severity of assault-related phobia was assessed
Table 1
Sample and Assault Characteristics (N  203)
Variable n %
Sex
Male 137 67.5
Female 66 32.5
Ethnicity
Caucasian 117 57.6
Black 67 33.3
Other or mixed race 19 9.1
Socioeconomic status
a
Very low income (less than £10,000) 86 43.4
Low income (£10,000–£20,000) 47 23.2
Moderate income (£20,000–£40,000) 34 16.7
High income (over £40,000) 23 11.3
Refused information 13 6.4
Marital status
Single 135 66.5
Married 36 17.7
Divorced/separated 24 11.8
Widowed 2 1.0
Refused information 6 2.9
Employment status
Employed/studying 137 67.5
Not employed 66 32.5
No. of assailants
Single assailant 106 52.2
Multiple assailants 96 47.3
Missing information 1 0.5
Weapon usage
Weapon not used 82 40.4
Weapon used 119 58.6
Missing information 2 1.0
Alcohol or drug use at the time of assault
Intoxicated 89 43.8
Not intoxicated 113 55.7
Missing information 1 0.5
Diagnoses and comorbidity at 2 weeks
Major depression (MD)/MD only 38/18 18.7/8.9
Acute stress disorder (ASD)/ASD only 34/10 16.7/4.9
Specific phobia (SP)/SP only 48/22 23.6/10.8
MD and ASD 4 2.0
SP and ASD 10 4.9
MD and SP 6 3.0
MD, ASD, and SP 10 4.9
Neither MD, ASD, nor SP 123 60.6
Diagnoses and comorbidity at 6 months (N  190)
MD/ MD only 31/8 16.3/4.2
Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD)/PTSD only 46/13 24.2/6.8
SP/SP only 38/6 20.0/3.1
MD and PTSD 4 2.1
SP and PTSD 11 5.8
MD and SP 3 1.6
MD, PTSD, and SP 16 8.4
Neither MD, PTSD, nor SP 127 66.8
Age in years, M (SD) 34.39 (11.17)
Education in years, M (SD) 14.00 (4.80)
No. of adult traumas, M (SD) 2.29 (1.41)
Assault duration in minutes, M (SD) 9.44 (18.52)
a Combined household income.
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DSM–IV criteria for specific phobias. It is similar to a scale for
accident-related phobia developed by Ehring, Ehlers, and Glucks-
man (2006) that distinguishes well between people with and with-
out travel phobias. Participants are asked to identify the situation,
person, or object that they feared most since the assault. They
indicate on a scale ranging from 0 (not at all)t o4( very strongly)
how afraid they were of this situation, person, or object (e.g., “I am
very afraid of . . .”) and how much they avoided it (e.g., “I always
avoid . . .”). The scale showed excellent internal consistency (
.94).
At 6 months, the SCID modules for PTSD, major depression,
and assault-related phobia were administered over the telephone
by the same interviewer. The severity of PTSD symptoms was
assessed with the PTSD Symptom Scale—Interview Version
(PSS–I; Foa, Riggs, Dancu, & Rothbaum, 1993). The interviewer
rated each of the PTSD symptoms on a scale ranging from 0 (not
at all)t o3( 5 or more times per week/very much). The total PSS–I
score is the sum of the ratings for the 17 items.
Cases were selected randomly for interrater reliability ratings,
which were high (.97 for ASD, 1.00 for depression, 
.85 for phobia, .82 for PTSD; on the basis of 56 interviews,
two raters who were each uninformed as to the other rater’s
diagnoses).
The interviewer asked participants when their symptoms started
to ensure that they were responses to the assault. If participants
reported that they had already been depressed or had other symp-
toms prior to the assault, the interviewer enquired whether the
symptoms worsened as a consequence of the assault.
Assessment of Potential Mediators
Response to Intrusions Questionnaire. The Response to Intru-
sions Questionnaire (Clohessy & Ehlers, 1999; Murray et al.,
2002) assesses dysfunctional cognitive strategies in response to
intrusive memories. It was developed over a series of studies and
shows good internal consistency and validity in predicting chronic
PTSD (Clohessy & Ehlers, 1999; Murray et al., 2002). The Ru-
mination subscale (.84 in the present study) comprises seven
items asking participants to rate what they do when memories of
the assault pop into their mind (e.g., “I dwell on how the event
could have been prevented,” or “I dwell on how I used to be before
the event”), each on a scale ranging from 0 (not at all)t o3
(always).
Perceived permanent change. This was assessed with the four
relevant items from the Posttraumatic Cognitions Inventory (Foa et
al., 1999)—for example, “I have permanently changed for the
worse” (.77 in the present sample). The Posttraumatic Cog-
nitions Inventory measures trauma-related thoughts and beliefs
that have been shown to discriminate well between trauma survi-
vors with and without PTSD. It has been shown to have good
internal consistency and retest reliability.
Verbal Intelligence
Participants completed the National Adult Reading Test
(NART; Nelson, 1991), a measure of verbal intelligence that is a
widely accepted method of estimating premorbid intelligence lev-
els. The NART requires participants to read out loud a list of 50
irregularly spelled words in order of increasing difficulty. Re-
sponses are individually scored as correct or incorrect, according
to their pronunciation. The number of words read correctly com-
prises the final score. The NART has excellent reliability and
construct validity (Crawford, Parker, Allan, Jack, & Morrison,
1991). It correlates highly with other measures of intelligence and
allows the prediction of full-scale IQ scores (Nelson, 1991). Cor-
relations with the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (Wechsler,
1997) in healthy participants were around r  .75 (Bright, Jaldow,
& Kopelman, 2002). Performance is characteristically preserved
relative to other measures of cognitive function (e.g., Crawford,
Steward, Garthwaite, Parker, & Besson, 1988). Recent studies
have shown that current NART performance is superior in esti-
mating a premorbid intelligence to scores based on demographic
variables, such as education (e.g., Bright et al., 2002).
History of Childhood Abuse and Adult Trauma
Trauma history. Participants were asked whether, during their
childhood, they had ever been physically abused or whether they
had had any unwanted sexual experience as part of an interview
about previous traumas (adapted from Kubany et al., 2000). They
also stated the nature of the abuse, their age, and distress at the
time. Participants further reported whether they had experienced
any from a list of other traumatic events, such as an earlier assault,
a sexual assault, a motor vehicle accident, warfare or combat, a
robbery, threat of death or serious body harm, or any other life
threatening or highly disturbing event, such as a natural disaster.
The number of traumatic events experienced was used as an index
of adult trauma history.
Objective assault severity. Objective severity of the recent
assault was scored as a composite score from the following infor-
mation: number of assailants (0  one assailant,1 two or more
assailants), assault duration (0  5 min or less,1 more than 5
min), injury severity (0  mild injuries,1 moderate injuries,
2  severe injuries), and weapon usage (0  no weapon used,1
weapon used; see Dunmore et al., 2001).
Procedure
The study was approved by the local ethics committees and
undertaken between July 2003 and December 2004. A few days
after their admission at the emergency department, assault survi-
vors received information about the study by mail and were invited
to participate in a research session at 2 weeks after the assault. The
invitation letter was followed by a telephone call in which further
information about the study was given. Upon arrival at the session,
participants had the opportunity to ask further questions and gave
written informed consent. In the session, participants provided
some details about their assaults, gave a short trauma narrative, did
a picture identification task (results are reported elsewhere), and
filled in questionnaires. They then completed the AMT. The di-
agnostic interviews followed. At 6 months, participants completed
the relevant SCID modules over the telephone and filled in ques-
tionnaires. Participants were reimbursed £50 ($97) for their time
and travel expenses.
Data Analysis
The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS 15.0) was
used for all analyses. Following common practice in investigations
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variable was the percentage of the first memories that participants
retrieved in response to the AMT cue words that were specific (we
refer to this variable as memory specificity). We tested differences
between participants with and without the disorders under inves-
tigation at 2 weeks (e.g., ASD vs. no ASD; major depression vs. no
depression) with analyses of variance using the general linear
modeling procedure, with the between-factors diagnostic group
and the within-subject factor AMT cue valence (positive vs. neg-
ative). Logistic regression analyses tested whether memory spec-
ificity contributed to the prediction of PTSD, depression, and
phobia at 6 months over and above what could be predicted from
initial symptoms. Multiple regression analyses were conducted for
moderator and mediator analyses (Baron & Kenny, 1986). PSS–I
scores were square root transformed to normalize distributions.
Mediation analyses were conducted in accord with McKinnon and
Dwyer (1993; see also McKinnon, Fairchild, & Fritz, 2007). The
Sobel test tested the significance of mediation effects.
The significance level was set at p  .05, two-tailed. On the
basis of the proportion of participants with the respective disor-
ders, the study had 86%, 82%, and 91% power in detecting group
differences in the order of d  0.55 (estimated from Scho ¨nfeld &
Ehlers, 2006; Scho ¨nfeld et al., 2007) at 2 weeks for depression,
ASD, and specific phobia, respectively, for .05, two-tailed. At
6 months, the sample size of N  190 had 78% power to detect an
odds ratio of 1.7 in the prediction of PTSD or depression diagnosis
with OGM, after adjusting for initial symptom severity (estimated
from Bryant, Sutherland, & Guthrie, 2007; Scho ¨nfeld & Ehlers,
2006).
Results
Diagnoses
As shown in Table 1, 18.7% had major depression at 2 weeks,
16.7% participants had ASD, and 23.6% had an assault-related
phobia. Of the 38 participants with major depression, 14 (36.8%)
had become depressed after the assault, and 24 (63.2%) had
already felt somewhat depressed before the assault. All of the latter
participants reported that the depression had significantly wors-
ened as a result of the assault; furthermore, none of these partic-
ipants had the same degree of depression present before the as-
sault. At 6 months, 16.3% of the participants had major depression,
24.2% had PTSD, and 20.0% had an assault-related specific pho-
bia. There was considerable comorbidity between the three disor-
ders under investigation. At 2 weeks, 41% of the participants who
met diagnostic criteria for ASD also had major depression, and
37% of the participants who met diagnostic criteria for major
depression also had ASD. At 6 months, 43% of participants with
PTSD had comorbid major depression, and 64% of those with
major depression also had PTSD.
Group Differences in Memory Specificity at 2 Weeks
On average, participants retrieved M  7.63 (SD  2.51)
specific memories across the 12 trials (64%); for positive cues,
M  3.81 (SD  1.47); for negative cues, M  3.82 (SD  1.46).
Omissions were rare (see Table 2). Table 2 presents the AMT
performance at 2 weeks for the ASD, major depression, and phobia
groups. For comparison, results for assault survivors who did not
have any of the diagnoses under consideration are also reported
(see Table 2). As a conservative test of the association between
low autobiographical memory specificity and ASD, major depres-
sion, and assault-related phobia, we compared participants meeting
diagnostic criteria for each of the disorders with those who did not
meet the criteria for that disorder
2 (which could include partici-
pants meeting criteria for another disorder). These results are
illustrated in Figure 1 (a table with means and standard deviations
is available online as supplemental material). Significant main
effects of diagnostic group indicated that participants with major
depression, F(1, 201)  6.08, p  .014, p
2  .029, and partici-
pants with ASD, F(1, 201)  3.98, p  .047, p
2  .019, retrieved
fewer specific autobiographical memories than participants with-
out these disorders. In contrast, participants diagnosed with
assault-related phobias did not show less specific memory retrieval
than those without phobia, F(1, 201)  0.17, p  .681, p
2  .001.
There were no main effects of cue valence (all ps  .52; all p
2 
.003) or interactions between valence and diagnostic group (all
ps  .42; all p
2  .004).
There were no significant group differences between any of the
diagnostic groups and the respective control groups without that
disorder in the assault-relatedness of specific memories (all ps 
.19; all p
2  .009). There was a significant main effect of valence:
Across diagnostic groups, participants produced more assault-
related memories to negative words than to positive words (all
ps  .001; all p
2  .133). There was also a significant interaction
between valence and ASD, F(1, 195)  4.09, p  .045, p
2  .021,
in that the ASD group retrieved more assault-related specific
memories to negative cues than participants without ASD
(MASD  61.27, SD  38.02 vs. MNoASD  42.13, SD  42.78,
respectively), F(1, 202)  5.86, p  .016. Interactions between
valence and depression and phobia diagnostic groups were non-
significant (both ps  .570; both p
2  .002). For omissions, there
were no significant group differences (all ps  .32; all p
2  .006)
or valence effects (all ps  .42; all p
2  .004). There was a
marginally significant interaction between depression and valence,
F(1, 201)  3.42, p  .066, p
2  .017. Depressed participants
tended to produce more omissions in response to positive cues than
nondepressed participants.
Prediction of PTSD, Major Depression, and Specific
Phobia at 6 Months
Logistic regression analyses tested whether memory specificity
at 2 weeks contributed to the prediction of PTSD, depression, and
assault-related specific phobia at 6 months over and above initial
symptoms. For PTSD at 6 months, ASD symptom severity at 2
weeks (ASDS) was forced into the regression in the first step and
explained 43% of the variance, 
2(1, N  190)  64.33, p  .001,
Nagelkerke R
2  .43. Low memory specificity significantly im-
proved the prediction, 
2(1, N  190)  7.04, p  .008, total
Nagelkerke R
2  .47, R
2  .04. We repeated the analysis to test
whether memory specificity contributed to the prediction of PTSD
without comorbid depression or phobia. Low memory specificity
2 The results were the same when the disorder groups were compared
with participants without depression, ASD, or phobia.
236 KLEIM AND EHLERSagain improved the prediction over and above initial symptom
severity at trend level, 
2(1, N  139)  3.18, p  .075, total
Nagelkerke R
2  .369, R
2  .04. For major depression at 6
months, depression severity at 2 weeks (number of symptoms on
SCID) was forced into the regression in the first step and explained
13% of the variance, 
2(1, N  187)  14.59, p  .001,
Nagelkerke R
2  .13. Low memory specificity significantly im-
proved the prediction, 
2(1, N  187)  7.45, p  .006, total
Nagelkerke R
2  .19, R
2  .06. For specific phobia at 6 months,
phobia severity at 2 weeks (Assault Phobia Questionnaire) was
forced into the regression in the first step and explained 27% of the
variance, 
2(1, N  187)  32.59, p  .001, Nagelkerke R
2  .27.
Low memory specificity did not add significantly to the prediction,

2(1, N  187)  1.45, p  .230, total Nagelkerke R
2  .28,
R
2  .01.
We also tested whether memory specificity predicts PTSD and
depression diagnoses at 6 months over and above initial depression
and ASD diagnoses. This was the case; memory specificity pre-
dicted both PTSD and depression over and above initial ASD and
depression diagnoses, 
2(1, N  190)  7.29, p  .008, total
Nagelkerke R
2  .292, R
2  .047 (PTSD), and 
2(1, N  190) 
6.23, p  .014, total Nagelkerke R
2  .229, R
2  .049 (depres-
sion).
Hierarchical linear regression analyses using the continuous
PSS–I and depression severity scores at 6 months as outcome
measures obtained the same results. In the first step, symptom
severity at 2 weeks was forced into the regression function, and
OGM in the second step. For both PTSD and depression, OGM
predicted over and above initial symptom severity: PTSD predic-
tion, Step 1: F(1, 188)  152.90, p  .001, R
2  .45; Step 2: F(1,
187)  6.20, p  .014, R
2  .02, OGM 	
 .14; depression
prediction, Step 1: F(1, 186)  27.00, p  .001, R
2  .13; Step 2:
F(1, 185)  4.18, p  .042, R
2  .02, OGM 	
 .14.
OGM in PTSD and Depression: Correlates, Moderation
Analyses, and Mediation Analyses
Table 3 shows the correlations between OGM, symptoms of
PTSD and depression, trauma variables, intelligence, and the vari-
ables considered for moderation and mediation analyses. OGM
correlated with the severity of the present assault and low intelli-
gence but not with childhood abuse and past traumas. To test
whether memory specificity predicts over and above intelligence
and assault severity, we entered NART scores and assault severity
in the first step of a hierarchical logistic regression analysis, and
we entered memory specificity in the second step. OGM at 2
weeks predicted both PTSD and major depression at 6 months over
and above what could be predicted from intelligence and assault
severity: for PTSD, 
2(1, N  181)  3.68, p  .055,
Nagelkerke R
2  .029; for depression, 
2(1, N  181)  5.76,
p  .016, Nagelkerke R
2  .052.
Figure 1. Mean percentages of specific autobiographical memories in
assault survivors with and without acute stress disorder (ASD), depression,
and assault-related phobia, respectively. Black bars  positive cues; gray
bars  negative cues; ns.  nonsignificant.
** p  .01.
Table 2
Autobiographical Memory Test Performance for Assault Survivors With Acute Stress Disorder (ASD), Major Depression (MD), and
Specific Phobia (SP), and for Assault Survivors Without Any of These Disorders at 2 Weeks
Variable
ASD
a
(n  34)
MD
a
(n  38)
SP
a
(n  48)
None of the
disorders
(n  123)
MS DMS DMS DMS D
Total % specific memories 57.11 20.53 56.14 23.47 62.50 21.33 66.01 20.02
Positive cues 55.39 25.53 56.14 31.10 61.81 25.72 66.67 22.18
Negative cues 58.82 24.01 56.14 21.72 63.19 26.62 65.45 24.16
Total % omissions 3.68 6.86 2.78 6.98 4.17 3.90 4.00 7.87
Positive cues 3.92 10.10 1.71 5.12 4.51 10.73 4.88 11.03
Negative cues 3.43 7.98 3.85 10.44 3.82 9.25 3.12 7.80
Total % assault-related specific memories
b 43.45 30.47 31.74 33.06 37.87 32.59 32.44 31.64
Positive cues 20.83 24.26 13.87 28.08 24.46 34.27 22.91 38.49
Negative cues 58.85 37.89 40.78 42.42 48.70 38.58 43.92 44.02
a Disorder groups overlap due to comorbidity.
b Index of proportion of specific memories that were assault related; data on test performance with regards
to other categories (categoric, extended, nonmemories), which were not part of this analysis, can be obtained from the authors.
237 AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY SPECIFICITY AFTER TRAUMAModeration effects. To test for moderation, we entered mem-
ory specificity in the first step of a hierarchical multiple regression
analysis, followed by the moderator variable under investigation,
followed by the interaction of memory specificity and the moder-
ator (Baron & Kenny, 1986). Sex, childhood abuse, and ethnicity
did not moderate the effect of specificity on PTSD or depression;
all interaction terms remained nonsignificant in the hierarchical
regression equations (all ps  .11).
History of major depression prior to the assault moderated the
effect of memory specificity on depression severity, as indicated
by a significant interaction (	
 .19, p  .042), which contrib-
uted significantly to the explained variance in depression symptom
severity at 6 months, R
2  .02, F(3, 186)  6.86, p  .001.
Further analyses showed that for participants with a history of
major depression (n  79), memory specificity significantly pre-
dicted depression severity at 6 months (	
 .32, p  .004).
Among participants who had never had a major depressive episode
before the assault (n  106), however, specificity was not a
significant predictor of depression symptom severity at follow-up
(	
 .12, p  .232). The interaction between history of major
depression and memory specificity was not significant for PTSD
symptom severity (	
 .11, p  .231).
Mediation effects. We used mediation analyses to test whether
rumination and permanent change mediated the effects of memory
specificity on PTSD and depression, using the three-step regres-
sion analyses approach suggested by Baron and Kenny (1986).
Step 1 requires that the hypothesized mediator correlates with the
independent variable (memory specificity). As shown in Table 3,
both rumination and permanent change correlated significantly
with memory specificity. Step 2 involves predicting the dependent
variable with the independent variable alone, and Step 3 involves
predicting the dependent variable with both the independent vari-
able and the mediator. Table 4 summarizes the results for Steps 2
and 3. Mediation is demonstrated when the amount of variance
explained by the independent variable is smaller when the medi-
ator is included in the regression function compared with when the
independent variable is considered alone. This was the case for
both hypothesized mediators. For both PTSD and depression se-
verity, the amount of variance explained by memory specificity
was reduced when rumination or perceived permanent change was
included in the regression, as indicated by significant Sobel tests
(all ps  .042).
Discussion
In this study, we aimed to investigate the relationship between
overgeneral autobiographical memory retrieval at 2-week post-
trauma and acute and chronic psychological disorders after a
traumatic experience. At 2 weeks, assault survivors with ASD
generated fewer specific autobiographical memories in the AMT
than participants without these disorders, replicating findings in
other trauma populations (Harvey et al., 1998; Kangas et al.,
2005). Furthermore, participants who had major depression after
the trauma showed lower memory specificity compared with those
who did not develop depression. These results are in line with a
recent study by van Minnen et al. (2005), who found that low
memory specificity predicted the exacerbation of depressive mood
after a stressful event, and with previous research showing OGM
in depressed people with a history of trauma (Hermans et al., 2004;
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238 KLEIM AND EHLERSRaes, Hermans, Williams, Beyers, et al., 2006). The lack of group
differences in OGM between assault survivors with and without
assault-related specific phobia is also consistent with the literature,
as previous studies found no relationship between OGM and
anxiety disorders other than PTSD (e.g., Wenzel et al., 2002,
2004). Thus, the findings support the specificity of OGM to
depression and ASD/PTSD. To our knowledge, this is the first
study to demonstrate specificity in the same population.
Low memory specificity at 2 weeks predicted both chronic
PTSD and major depression at 6 months, and predicted over and
above what could be predicted from initial symptom severity,
regardless of whether diagnosis or symptom severity at 6 months
was used as outcomes. The current result is in contrast to a recent
study of cancer patients (Kangas et al., 2005), which found that
deficits in the retrieval of specific memories were not predictive of
subsequent PTSD. However, the smaller sample size and attrition
during follow-up may have affected these results.
The present study did not find any effects of AMT cue valence.
The literature shows inconsistent findings (van Vreeswjik & de
Wilde, 2004), with some studies reporting patients to be less
specific in response to positive cues (McNally, Litz, Prassas, Shin,
& Weathers, 1994; Williams & Scott, 1988), whereas others report
OGM effects in response to negative cues, rather than positive and
neutral cues (Jones et al., 1999; Mackinger, Pachinger, Leibet-
seder, & Fartacek, 2000). In line with our findings, McNally et al.
(1995), Goddard et al. (1996), Scho ¨nfeld and Ehlers (2006), and
Scho ¨nfeld et al. (2007) reported OGM in patients with PTSD and
depression in response to both positive and negative cues.
In the present study, we also explored correlates of OGM, and
potential moderator and mediators of the relationship between
OGM and posttrauma psychopathology. Sex, ethnicity, and history
of childhood abuse did not interact with OGM in predicting PTSD
or depression at 6 months in the present sample. There was no
relationship between OGM and childhood abuse and number of
adult traumas, but OGM correlated with the severity of the recent
assault. Together, these results point to a relationship between
OGM and trauma, but they also suggest that OGM does not
necessarily develop after trauma. The results are in line with a
recent review that concluded that trauma exposure per se is un-
likely to be the primary mechanism leading to overgenerality
(Moore & Zoellner, 2007). Instead, OGM may characterize those
survivors of childhood or adult trauma who develop psychopathol-
ogy. Some previous studies also failed to find a significant asso-
ciation between childhood trauma and OGM (Johnson et al., 2005;
Wessel et al., 2001). However, our study only included a limited
assessment of childhood abuse, and some participants may not
have disclosed abuse or other previous traumas as no treatment
was offered. A more detailed assessment of childhood abuse would
have allowed us to investigate the relationship more comprehen-
sively and conclusively.
Recent studies by Dalgleish et al. (2007) and Raes, Hermans,
Williams, Demyttenaere, et al. (2006) have suggested that the
AMT is sensitive to individual differences in executive capacity
and depression-related reduction in working memory. In line with
their findings, OGM correlated with a measure of verbal intelli-
gence in the current study. However, OGM predicted both PTSD
and depression at 6 months over and above what could be pre-
dicted from intelligence.
A history of major depression prior to the assault moderated the
relationship between OGM and major depression, but not PTSD, at
follow-up. These results are in accord with the view that prior
depressive episodes constitute a vulnerability factor that may pre-
dispose individuals to more general memory retrieval (Gibbs &
Rude, 2004). There is evidence that individuals remitted from
depression show more overgeneral autobiographical memory re-
trieval than never-depressed controls (Kuyken & Brewin, 1995;
Mackinger et al., 2000). The present results are of interest in the
discussion about findings that risk of further depressive episodes
increases with every consecutive episode and that successive ep-
isodes of major depression require less and less external provoca-
tion by stressful life events (e.g., Kendler, Thornton, & Gardner,
2000). It has been hypothesized that in people with repeated
episodes of major depression, new episodes become increasingly
mediated by internal processes, such as ruminative thinking cycles
reactivated by dysphoric mood (e.g., Ma & Teasdale, 2004). OGM
Table 4
Results of Regression Analyses Testing Whether Rumination and Permanent Change Mediate the Relationship Between Memory
Specificity at 2 Weeks and PTSD and Depression Severity at 6 Months
Predictor in regression
Regression coefficient for memory
specificity (independent variable) p
For regression analyses including
mediators
% total effect
that is mediated Sobel test p
Prediction of PTSD severity (PSS–I) at 6 months
Memory specificity only 
.238 .001 N/A N/A N/A
Memory specificity and rumination 
.137 .038 30.78 
2.46 .014
Memory specificity and permanent change 
.133 .053 48.11 
2.73 .006
Prediction of depression severity (SCID) at 6 months
Memory specificity only 
.195 .001 N/A N/A N/A
Memory specificity and rumination 
.151 .047 18.21 
2.02 .042
Memory specificity and permanent change 
.115 .128 36.33 
2.73 .006
Note. Memory specificity is indexed as the percentage of first memories that were specific. Negative regression coefficients indicate positive associations
with overgeneral memory. PTSD  posttraumatic stress disorder; PSS–I  PTSD Symptom Scale—Interview Version; N/A  not applicable as there was
no mediator entered; SCID  Structured Clinical Interview for DSM–IV.
239 AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY SPECIFICITY AFTER TRAUMAmay be an indicator of this cognitive vulnerability to recurrence of
depression.
As expected, low memory specificity was related to greater
rumination about the trauma and greater perceived permanent
change. These variables were also shown to fully or partly mediate
the relationship between OGM and both PTSD and depression at
follow-up. Previous research has shown that rumination increases
the tendency to retrieve overgeneral memories (see Park, Goodyer,
& Teasdale, 2004). This is consistent with Williams’s (1996)
hypothesis that self-focused rumination contributes to a block of
specific autobiographical retrieval (“mnemonic interlock”). Previ-
ous studies have found associations between OGM and rumination
in depression (Raes, Hermans, Williams, Beyers, et al., 2006) and
rumination about the trauma in trauma survivors (Scho ¨nfeld &
Ehlers, 2006). Like the present study, Raes, Hermans, Williams,
Beyers, et al. (2006) also found that rumination partly mediated the
relationship between OGM and depression 7 months later, al-
though they used a different measure of rumination that was not
trauma related. The result that perceived permanent change medi-
ated the effects of OGM on PTSD severity is consistent with
Scho ¨nfeld and Ehlers’s (2006) suggestion that inability to retrieve
specific memories from one’s life may enhance the sense that one
has changed for the worse as a person, which in turn contributes to
the maintenance of PTSD (Dunmore et al., 2001; Ehlers et al.,
2000).
Although the study has several strengths, including a large
sample size, recruitment soon after a trauma, and a prospective
longitudinal design, it also has several limitations. First, it remains
unclear whether low autobiographical memory specificity is a
predisposing factor or a consequence of the trauma. For practical
reasons, it was not possible to assess OGM prior to the assault.
Hence, future research will need to address whether OGM effects
are present prior to the development of psychopathology (see
Bryant et al., 2007). Second, there was high comorbidity among
the disorders, which is common in survivors of violent assault
(e.g., Kilpatrick et al., 2003). This raises the question of whether
the outcomes studied represented different disorders. Prior studies
suggest that PTSD and depression are best conceptualized as
related, but distinct, responses to trauma (Blanchard, Buckley,
Hickling, & Taylor, 1998; Breslau, Chase, & Anthony, 2002;
O’Donnell, Creamer, Pattison, & Atkin, 2004). High comorbidity
makes it difficult to demonstrate specificity. Nevertheless, our
findings show that OGM was specific to depression and ASD,
whereas participants with phobia did not differ from participants
without phobia in autobiographical memory retrieval. It is note-
worthy that the study was conservative in testing specificity, as it
allowed comorbid ASD and specific phobia. If we had excluded
comorbid cases with ASD from the phobia group, we would have
biased the results in favor of finding specificity of OGM for ASD
as opposed to phobia. However, the high comorbidity may have
compromised the ability to detect differences between depression
and PTSD. Nevertheless, given the high comorbidity between the
disorders, as well as the symptom overlap in diagnostic criteria
between PTSD and depression, and between PTSD and phobia, it
might be useful for future researchers to adopt a dimensional rather
than a categorical approach. This could involve using symptom
clusters across disorders (e.g., phobic responses, numbing, and
reexperiencing) rather than symptom dimensions that are based on
different diagnostic entities as outcomes. Third, diagnoses at 6
months were based on a SCID interview conducted over the phone,
rather than a face-to-face diagnostic interview. Such telephone
interviews may make participants somewhat less forthcoming in
providing information about their symptoms than face-to-face in-
terviews. However, the interviewer had already established a re-
lationship with the participants at the first assessment, which
makes it unlikely that participants withheld information from her
later. Fourth, the sample comprised nearly exclusively survivors of
physical assaults. The results are therefore limited to survivors of
physical assaults, and they need to be replicated with other trauma
populations.
In the present study, we pointed to an “added value” of OGM in
the prediction of chronic PTSD and depression over and above
initial symptom severity. However, the observed effect sizes were
in the small to medium range. OGM only predicted an additional
4%–6% of the variance of depression and PTSD at follow-up.
Nevertheless, the results are of interest, as initial symptom severity
is a strong predictor of PTSD (e.g., Rothbaum, Foa, Riggs, Mur-
dock, & Walsh, 1992), and very few variables have been shown to
predict PTSD over and above initial symptoms. These effect sizes
observed in this study are in the range of the best replicated
predictors of PTSD according to a recent meta-analysis by Ozer,
Best, Lipsey, and Weiss (2003). Transformed into binominal effect
sizes, the results suggest that a trauma survivor high in OGM has
an approximately 20% greater chance of having PTSD or depres-
sion at 6 months than a survivor low in OGM, an effect size that
exceeds that of many standard medical interventions (Rosnow &
Rosenthal, 2003).
Interestingly, the two factors that were found to partly mediate
the effect of OGM on future depression and PTSD, rumination
about the trauma and perceived permanent change, are among the
few variables that have been shown to have incremental predictive
validity over and above initial symptoms (Dunmore et al., 2001;
Ehlers, Mayou, & Bryant, 1998). Overall, given the small incre-
mental predictive power and the results of the mediator analyses,
practical applications of the AMT as a tool for identifying trau-
matized people at risk of chronic PTSD appear limited. Question-
naire measures, such as the rumination or perceived permanent
change scales, are easier to administer and score than the AMT and
may thus be more useful for screening programs.
Nevertheless, the results point to potential therapeutic strategies.
It is possible that training in the accessibility of specific memories
would help people break through the capture and rumination cycle
(Williams et al., 2006) and help people put the trauma into per-
spective by integrating it into the context of other experiences. Our
data would suggest that such training may be potentially relevant
for trauma survivors with episodes of past depression. There is
evidence that OGM is modifiable (McBride, Segal, Kennedy, &
Gemar, 2007; Watkins, Teasdale, & Williams, 2000). Alterna-
tively, one may argue that the most promising way to reduce OGM
and poor posttrauma adaptation would be to target rumination. In
a series of studies, Watkins and colleagues (e.g., Watkins &
Teasdale, 2001; Watkins et al., 2000) found that reducing rumi-
nation leads to less overgeneral memory retrieval in depressed
patients. Reducing rumination is a component of some effective
treatments for PTSD (e.g., Ehlers, Clark, Hackmann, McManus, &
Fennell, 2005). It would also be of interest to study whether
treatment procedures used in effective treatments of PTSD to
240 KLEIM AND EHLERScounteract perceived permanent change, such as “reclaiming your
life” assignments (Ehlers & Clark, 2000), change OGM bias.
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